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Abstract—Securely managing shared information in dis-
tributed environments across multiple organisations is a
challenge. Distributed information management systems
must be able to support individual organisations’ informa-
tion policies whilst securing global consistency and com-
pleteness. This paper proposes a multi-agent approach to a
distributed multi-organisational system design based on this
principle, focusing on the example of the distributed digital
criminal dossier used in the Courts of Amsterdam and Rot-
terdam, compiled and managed by the Public Prosecution.
Security requirements are identified and a distributed multi-
agent architecture proposed.
Index Terms—Security, Distributed Systems, Digital Crimi-
nal Dossiers, Legal Domain
I. INTRODUCTION
Managing shared information securely and efficiently
across multiple independent organizations is a challenge -
the challenge this paper addresses. In general, individual
organizations manage their own information locally on
their own systems, according to their own information
policies. If information is to be shared, however, addi-
tional policies are needed to manage global correctness
and consistency.
One example of an environment in which information
needs to be shared between multiple semi-independent
organisations is the environment in which the Public Pros-
ecution compiles and manages distributed digital criminal
dossiers. Such dossiers are currently being used in the
Courts of Amsterdam and Rotterdam in a number of pilot
studies. Earlier work [1] explored the potential of a cen-
tralised system for digital criminal dossier management.
This paper explores the potential of a distributed digital
criminal dossiers, supported by a multi-agent system
architecture [2], to improve consistency, completeness,
integrity and security of the information in such dossiers.
The distributed architecture allows physically dis-
tributed information sources, such as Municipals and the
prison systems, to remain responsible for the integrity of
their own information content, each monitored by one or
more of their own software agents. The Public Prosecutor
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has a centralized role and is responsible for providing the
infrastructure that enables other organizations to securely
add information and securely access information in crim-
inal dossiers. Together these organizations form a semi-
open environment: an environment in which organizations
have their own control over their own information. In this
environment Dutch Law, however dictates the exchange
of this information with other organizations. This paper
discusses some of the details involved in the use of such
dossiers, focusing on security issues. See [3], [4] for more
details on enforcing consistency and completeness and on
implementation details.
All legal and procedural details discussed in this paper
are interpreted in the context of Dutch law, but can be
extended to other legislation.
The paper first explores security requirements in the
semi-open distributed environment associated with the
compilation of criminal dossiers. Section III introduces
distributed digital dossiers, Section IV discusses the asso-
ciated security architecture in light of the security require-
ments. Domain specific legal requirements are discussed
in Section V and the paper ends with a discussion and
conclusions.
II. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Security is essential in the environment of distributed
digital criminal dossiers addressed in this paper. Secu-
rity requirements (1) hold for all comparable distributed
computer systems, but also requirements (2) that hold in
this specific context. Nine requirements, related directly
to relatively standard security requirements for distributed
clinical information systems [5], have be identified:
A. Access Control: each individual dossier and each
referring record (see Section IV) contained therein
must be marked with an access control list naming
the people or groups of people who may read and
alter data. The system must prevent anyone not on
the access control list from accessing the dossier in
any way.
B. Dossier creation: a dossier is always created by the
Public Prosecutor.
C. Control: separate records in the dossier are the
responsibility of individuals/organizations on the
access control list. This control can be transferred
to other persons/organizations when required.
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D. Notification: defendants must be informed of the
content of the dossier as required by Dutch law.
During the trial period, i.e., when a dossier is
finalized and sent to the Court, all parties (public
prosecution, lawyers and court) need to be informed
of updates to the dossier. Defendants have the
right to challenge the correctness of the information
contained in the dossier during trial.
E. Persistence: during the trail period, no party may
have the ability to delete (parts of) the dossier, un-
less this is mandated by the Dutch law because the
time for enforcement has passed (extinguishment).
F. Attribution: all changes to (records of) the dig-
ital dossier must be marked with the subject’s
(users/organizations) identity as well as date and
time. An audit trial must also be kept of all dele-
tions1.
G. Information Flow: no information may be copied
from one dossier to another unless this is allowed
by the access control policy.
H. Aggregation control: aggregation of information is
only possible for persons/organizations (such as the
Public Prosecution) who have the explicit right to
do so.
I. Trusted computing base: computer systems that
handle digital dossiers need maintained in a trusted
environment, handled by trusted system administra-
tors.
In addition, in the specific context of the digital dossier
the following additional requirements hold:
J. Secure transfer: the (physically) distributed organi-
zations may only exchange information over secure
communication channels that guarantee confiden-
tiality and integrity of the transferred data.
K. Compartmentalization of information: organizations
may only access those parts of the dossier for which
they are responsible and/or those parts where the
need to access has been identified.
L. Consistency: the data in the dossier must be (inter-
nally) consistent.
M. Completeness: each dossier must be complete when
it is sent to the Court. The Court forwards the
dossier to the relevant judge(s) and lawyer(s).
N . Backups: periodically backups of each dossier must
be made. These backup copies are secured against
unauthorized access in a similar fashion as the
original dossiers.
Consistency and completeness are especially challeng-
ing requirements: they must be guaranteed. When an au-
thorized organization, e.g. the Council for Child Welfare,
adds a record to a specific digital dossier, the system
needs to check whether the information is consistent with
all other information in the dossier, for example whether
personal information, such as name, address, age and sex
of a subject, is consistent across records/documents.
1For our purpose attribution and auditability can be regarded as
similar requirements.
Completeness requirements include general complete-
ness requirements, and offense specific completeness re-
quirements. General completeness requirements specify
that, for example, a subject’s personal administrative
information, the offense for which he/she is charged,
and the official report filed by the Police, must be in-
cluded in each distributed digital criminal dossier. In
addition, offense specific completeness requirements hold,
for example, if the offense for which a subject is being
charged is a drunken driving charge then an alcohol test
by an authorized lab must be included in the dossier.
Completeness of the dossier must be guaranteed before
it is transferred to the Court.
The next sections propose a design for an agent based
support system for the distributed digital criminal dossiers
that fulfills the above mentioned requirements.
III. DISTRIBUTED DIGITAL DOSSIERS
The intrinsic nature of criminal dossiers with physi-
cally distributed sources of information distributed over
different organizations is the motivation for proposing a
distributed digital criminal dossier. Figure 1 below shows
some of these (distributed) sources2.
Municipal
DataBase
Criminal
Records
Probation Officers
Child Welfare Office Prison System
Public Prosecution
................
Digital
Dossier
Criminal
Figure 1. Some of the Information Sources used to compile a Digital
Criminal Dossier
This section describes the design, organization, abstract
implementation, life cycles models of distributed criminal
dossiers and how such dossiers can be managed by agents.
An example based on juvenile repeat offenders [3] is
used in this paper to illustrate the types of information
included in a distributed digital criminal dossier and
their sources, the focus is on the information exchange
between Public Prosecution and the Council for Child
Welfare3. This scenario has been chosen because repeat
2In this context, the Police has a special kind of role. It delivers in-
formation needed for compiling dossiers, but that does not, for example,
changes information in dossiers created by the Public Prosecution, as
other organizations such as the Municipals, will do in our approach.
Information exchange between Police and other organizations does thus
not occur via distributed digital criminal dossiers.
3In the Dutch context the Council for Child Welfare has the task to
investigate all crimes of minors. In addition to the criminal offences of
the minor, the family situation and other relevant social factors are taken
into account. This results in a motivated advice for suitable punishment
(if applicable) of the suspect.
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offenders and especially juvenile offenders represent an
interesting and socially important subject. It also clearly
illustrates how multiple physically distributed organiza-
tions can work together in an efficient way in the semi-
open environment responsible for criminal dossiers.
A. Design and Organization
Each individual digital dossier is -by Dutch law- cre-
ated by the Public Prosecution once it decides, on the
basis of information available, to prosecute a defendant.
A newly created dossier consists of records and meta
data. The meta data contains information such as the
access control list for the dossier, logging information on
who altered or accessed information at what time, and
when the last backup of the dossier was made. This meta
data part of the dossier is stored centrally by the Public
Prosecution.
Individual records are the responsibility of different
organizations. Administrative information, for example, is
managed and maintained by the defendant’s local author-
ities4 and information on a juvenile’s family situation is
provided by the Council for Child Welfare. Distributing
both the data (information) and the responsibility for
the data ensures that information in the digital dossier
is kept as up-to-date as possible. Changes in data are
flagged by the relevant organizations and transmitted to
the Public Prosecution for synchronization of the com-
plete (distributed) dossier.
Thus the basic dossier itself is stored by the Public
Prosecution while relevant records are maintained and
stored by the responsible organizations and then synchro-
nized with the digital dossier by the Public Prosecution.
B. Dossier Implementation
Dossiers are implemented with a light weight ‘skeleton
framework based on XML. Fields in this XML document
contain keywords and references to other (possibly, but
not necessarily, XML-based) documents. The distributed
nature of the dossier emerges through the references
which can be both to local and remote systems.
The central part of the dossier, as created by the Public
Prosecution, specifies which information is to be included,
such as: status (mandatory, optional), dependencies, data
maintainer (which organization), access rights, etc. This
meta data depends on the charged crime. This paper
assumes that standard XML templates exist for each type
of crime, and that these templates are used by the Public
Prosecution to structure the meta-data in a dossier, see [3]
for a proposal to use automatic clustering techniques to
construct (part of) this information automatically. Figure 2
depicts an example of part of a dossier with both meta-
data and data provided by the Public Prosecution [4]. It
is based on a real dossier from an actual case, but all
4In the Dutch context Municipals are responsible for keeping admin-
istrative records of its citizens. Other countries use other organizational
units to maintain these records, or non at all, as is, for example, the
case in the United States.
data has been anonymized [3]. The case of a juvenile
repeat offender has been chosen to illustrate the use of
distributed digital dossiers, as a number of physically
distributed organizations are involved.
Meta-data includes the dossier number, creation date,
type of offense and access control lists. The example
depicted in Figure 2 specifies that in this case the dossier
has been opened by the Public Prosecution of Amsterdam
on the first of July 2007. The offense for which the
subject is being charged is shoplifting, and the subject
is a (known) juvenile repeat offender. This dossier fur-
ther specifies that four named employees of the Public
Prosecution have been assigned permission to read this
document (identified in this example by numbers 1234,
2345, 3456, 4567) and that only two of these four
employees have permission to edit parts of the dossier,
i.e., write permission, see Section IV for more details on
the access control mechanism and other security issues.
<Dossier>
<MetaData>
<Ref>PubProsAmsterdam-00001</Ref>
<CreationDate>1-7-2007</CreationDate>
<Offense>
<Main>Shoplifting</Main>
<Category>JuvenileRepeatOffender</Category>
</Offense>
<Access>
<Read>1234,2345,3456,4567</Read>
<Write>1234,4567</Write>
</Access>
...
</MetaData>
<Records>
<MandatoryInfo>
<PersonalInfo>ref:MuniDatAmsterdam-123456
</PersonalInfo>
<ReportCCW>ref:CCW-234567</ReportCCW>
...
</MandatoryInfo>
<OptionalInfo>
<StatementSubject>ref:PP-00001statement.pdf
</StatementSubject>
<Media>ref:PP-00001-movie1.avi,
ref:PP-00001-movie2.avi
</Media>
...
</OptionalInfo>
</Records>
</Dossier>
Figure 2. Example of the centralized ‘skeleton’ Digital Criminal
Dossier [4]
The template distinguishes between mandatory and op-
tional information for a specific crime. Such information
represents the knowledge used by the Public Prosecution
to check completeness of a dossier - and provides the
structure needed for automated completeness checks [3].
Certain information must always be included in a
dossier, such as the subject’s administrative data, and
the original police report concerning an incident. Other
information is mandatory for a specific kind of offense
and/or type of offender. In this particular example, in-
dependent of the crime for which the subject has been
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charged, the subject is a juvenile: according to Dutch law,
a report by the Council for Child Welfare is mandatory.
Other information, however, is optional. In this example,
footage of the incident on the basis of which the sub-
ject has been charged, recorded by a video surveillance
camera, is included. Note that a court case can only
commence if all mandatory information is included in a
dossier. The dossier also contains a number of references,
indicated by the ref: keyword, to specific documents
and their source. In this example references local to the
Public Prosecution (PP) are the subjects original state-
ment (ref:PP- 00001statement.pdf) and the
video evidence (ref:PP-00001-movie1.avi and
ref:PP-00001- movie2.avi). References to XML
documents to be provided by other organizations, in this
example, include the (national) Council for Child Wel-
fare (ref:CCW-234567) and the Municipal database of
Amsterdam (ref:MuniDatAmsterdam-123456).
A distributed digital criminal dossier thus consists of a
number of documents in a networked structure distributed
over physically distributed locations with the Public Pros-
ecution as the central coordinator. Note that digital crim-
inal dossiers always form the root of this network, i.e.,
digital criminal dossiers are not included in (referenced
from) other dossiers, unless the referring dossier is also a
digital criminal dossier. This ensures that digital criminal
dossiers themselves are always controlled by the Public
Prosecution, an important security requirement.
C. Life Cycle model
When the Public Prosecutor decides that a case is ready
for Court the dossier is ‘frozen’: the dossier is finalized
and forwarded by the Court to the presiding judge and
the defendant’s lawyer. From this point on the criminal
dossier is no longer distributed and other organizations
are no longer responsible for ‘their’ records. Note, that
consequently trials are based on information available at
this point in time.
As is currently the case, the Public Prosecutor decides
which information is included in the frozen version of
the dossier, and which not, based on its judgment of its
relevance. Additional information can, from this moment
on, only be added by one of the parties involved (prosecu-
tors, judges and defense lawyers) by a special procedure
that ensures that the relevant additions to the dossier are
distributed to all concerned parties.
Once a case has been tried, a dossier can be ‘defrosted’,
i.e., made distributed again, re-’frozen’ when needed for
a trial, etc. This process can be repeated numerous times
(re-trials, appeals etc.) until a dossier is finally closed.
‘Freezing’ and ‘defrosting’ of distributed digital
dossiers can be implemented in various ways. Two dif-
ferent life cycle models are discussed here: the straight-
forward (but inefficient) naive life cycle model and the
efficient (though somewhat more involved) semi-freezing
life cycle model.
• The naive life cycle model, is the conceptually
most straightforward model. A dossier is ‘frozen’
(static and centralized) and ‘defrosted’ (dynamic
and distributed) as required. Note that a technical
solution for defrosting a dossier is non-trivial, as it
requires identification of the appropriate organization
for each record in the dossier and complete new
resynchronization of information contained in the
dossier’s records. Figure 3 illustrates the naive model
graphically.
Figure 3. The naive life cycle model
A distributed digital criminal dossier is shown on the
far left. This dossier is frozen, resulting in a static file
with the current state of the data. Next, as indicated
by the solid black arrows copies of this static dossier
are distributed to the Public Prosecution, the Court
and the defendant’s lawyer. If a new trial is needed,
e.g. due to a miss-trial or an appeal, the dossier
is distributed again (defrosted), as shown on the
far right of the picture. Each organization is again
responsible for ‘its’ records in the dossier.
• The semi-freezing life cycle model, is a less drastic
solution. Freezing entails making a local central copy
of the dossier as in the above case. The difference is
that the distributed version of the dossier still exists.
If and when a dossier is defrosted, a new version is
instantly available (again). This model is technically
preferable, the only difficulty that can arise is that
during trial, additional information may have been
added to the dossier (by the Court or the defense).
This information needs to be distributed to the rel-
evant parties. The Public Prosecution is responsible
for distributing this information to the responsible
parties. The semi-freezing model is schematically
displayed in Figure 4.
Figure 4. The semi-freezing life cycle model
As in the naive model, the distributed digital crimi-
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nal dossier is shown on the far left. Once the dossier
is frozen and copied (solid arrows), the dossier
remains distributed (indicated by the dashed arrows).
If and when a case is directed to a new Court, a
completely new dossier can be acquired on the basis
of the information as known to the distributed organi-
zations responsible for the records. New information
that surfaced during the trial, however, needs to be
incorporated into the rest of the distributed dossier.
Both models have technical and conceptual advantages.
As the semi-freezing model ensures a maximum of both
control and responsibility for all parties involved this
model is preferred. As such it is used in the remainder of
this paper.
D. Managing Distributed Digital Dossiers with Agents
This section describes the functional design of a multi
agent system for distributed digital dossier management.
Distributed multi-agent systems provide a promising
paradigm for large scale distributed autonomous sys-
tems [2]. Agents are pro-active, autonomous, possibly
mobile systems capable of interacting with other agents
and services, and adapting to their environment [6]. The
main reasons for choosing the agent paradigm is that
it provides a conceptually clear model for autonomous
systems that supports modularity, security and scalability.
Specific tasks can be implemented by dedicated agents,
allowing for a clear separation of concerns and straight-
forward integration of new functionality as new agents,
when needed.
From a technical perspective, one or more computer
hosts that are maintained by the same organization to-
gether form a location. A dedicated middleware layer, the
agent platform ensures that all hosts with a location can be
viewed as one logical unit. The middleware ensures that
all agents can uniquely be identified (using a lookup ser-
vice), that agents on different locations can communicate
with each other and that, if required, agents can migrate
between locations5. Examples of such agent systems
include AgentScape [7], JADE [8] and SeMoA [9].
Each organization has its own hosts with its own secu-
rity policies. This allows local control and responsibility
of data, and access to data with each organization, while
at the same time it supports the use of global security
policies that can guarantee a minimal set of (global)
security requirements across organizations. Section IV
describes several of the dedicated agents that are used
to manage distributed digital dossiers.
Note that, in our model all interaction with the digital
dossier is facilitated by means of agents. Agents are the
single points of entry to dossiers. For example, only
authorized agents can alter records in a dossier within
a organization. The next section describes the specifics of
the security architecture.
5Not all agent systems allow migration of agents.
IV. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The security requirements identified in Section II pro-
vide the outline for the presentation of the security
architecture.
A. Access Control
The semi-open nature of the digital criminal dossier
environment makes access control a particular challenge.
Access control regulations in such systems generally tend
to make all data more difficult to access, including the
less sensitive information that can be of interest to a large
public. This phenomenon is known as ‘label creep’ in the
literature [10].
Our proposed solution handles this problem by means
of a two-tier access model. On the first level role based ac-
cess control [11] is used as an access control mechanism
for access to the distributed digital criminal dossier. Each
‘role’, such as judge, lawyer, Public Prosecutor, or clerk,
has certain rights with regard to the dossier. This typically
depends on specific security policies, for example, a clerk
may only add information to the dossier, not delete or
modify anything, while a Public Prosecutor may change
existing information in the dossier and even create new
dossiers.
Additionally, the second access level uses access con-
trol lists [12] to limit the access of individuals after
their role has been determined. Each dossier contains,
in its meta data, information on specific individuals: it
specifies per individual who may change, read, delete or
add information to a dossier. For example, judge A may
have permission to read a specific dossier (as it’s his/her
case), while judge B may not (even though judge B has
the role of ‘judge’). Thus in order to change records in
the digital dossier (via an agent) a user not only has to
be assigned a specific role, he/she also has to be on the
access control list of a specific criminal dossier. Figure 2
shows such an access control list where subjects identified
by numbers 1234, 2345, 3456 and 4567 have read
access for a dossier and only subjects 1234 and 4567
have write access.
The distinction between roles and individuals is crucial
in a dynamic environment (such as is the case associated
with the digital dossier). Security policies based on roles
can be regarded as static (or at least ‘long lived’) and are
typically globally valid (at all possible locations), while
individual access control lists are typically dynamic (or
‘short lived’). Individual policies typically only apply per
dossier, or even shorter, for example, when a criminal
dossier is handed over to another clerk, prosecutor or
judge. The combination of static and dynamic access
control rules should also limit the aforementioned ‘label
creep’ phenomena.
In addition, each user also has a public/private key pair
and a corresponding digital certificate, as specified in the
X509 standard [13]. The certificates are organized in a
standard PKI infrastructure [12], which is run at the Public
Prosecution, and are used for signatures on individual
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records, to enforce integrity of a digital criminal dossier
in its totality.
B. Dossier Creation
The above-mentioned access control model is used to
authenticate (the role of) Public Prosecutor(s). A ded-
icated agent then enforces the policy that only Public
Prosecutors can create dossiers.
C. Control
The above mentioned access control lists are main-
tained per document, where a document can (1) either
be a digital criminal dossier maintained by the Pub-
lic Prosecutor (as seen in Figure 2), (2) an adminis-
trative dossier maintained by one of the other orga-
nizations (for example, ref:MuniDatAmsterdam in
Figure 2) or (3) another kind of document (for exam-
ple ref:PP-00001-movie1.avi in Figure 2). Each
document thus has its own access control list. This
means, in particular, that someone can have access to the
digital criminal dossier, stored at the Public Prosecution,
without having access to all of the referring records the
criminal dossier contains. This ensures that local orga-
nizations keep control over access to their information.
Note however that organizations are not completely free
to determine who can access a specific document. They do
have to act in accordance with Dutch law. For example,
the Council for Child Welfare must inform the Public
Prosecutor, that is responsible for a case involving a
minor, of the minor’s social environment. The Council
for Child Welfare can chose to only allow this specific
Public Prosecutor access to the document, without, for
example, allowing legal clerks to view the information it
contains.
Similarly, organizations or individuals may transfer
their access rights to others as long as this is allowed by
Dutch law. For example, a Public Prosecutor can transfer
a criminal dossier, together with the access rights to the
dossier, to another Public Prosecutor.
D. Notification
Dedicated agents are deployed to automatically inform
all involved parties of the progress of a case.
Users are also notified when certain ‘exceptional’ be-
havior occurs within the system. Examples include in-
consistencies found between records in a dossier (point L
below) or multiple failures to comply to the access control
mechanism (point A above). In such instances dedicated
clerks are notified who deal with the problem.
E. Persistence
Information in a criminal dossier changes during the
compilation of a dossier. To ensure that no information
is accidentally or intentionally removed, all versions
of a dossier are securely stored by a dedicated agent.
This storage system also serves as a backup store. The
information is encrypted and chained signatures, i.e., for
each version, are added to ensure both confidentiality and
integrity of the criminal dossiers. An outside trusted third
party is responsible for maintaining this backup site. See
also points F and N below.
Another dedicated agent guards the lifelines of data
entries in the digital dossier. For example, information
obtained from the Council for Child Welfare concerning
juvenile suspects may, by Dutch law, only be kept for
a maximum period of five years and should also be
destroyed when the subject turns 18. Note that simply
removing a reference in the central part of the dossier at
the Public Prosecution is enough to obtain this result.
F. Attribution
Criminal dossiers can only be accessed through agents.
Each user of the system, for example a public prosecutor
or a judge, uses its own agent to access a criminal
dossier (or part thereof). Each individual also has his/her
own X509 public/private key-pair. Whenever an agent
performs an action, such as reading or altering a file, this
is logged by a signature performed by the agent, on behalf
of its owner. This ensures that actions can be attributed
to specific users.
A dedicated logging agent is responsible for logging
all information per dossier (the signatures that attribute
who changed what, when, etc.). This information is
safely stored (preferably offline and encrypted) and needs
to be integrity preserving (using signatures). The same
trusted third party that ensures persistence of the criminal
dossiers (point E above) is responsible for storing this
information securely.
G. Information Flow
Access control (point A above) together with con-
trol (point C) are used to limit illicit information flow.
However, totally disallowing illicit information flow is in
practice not possible. See the discussion in Section VI for
more on this point.
H. Aggregation Control
Effectively limiting illicit aggregation control is prob-
ably as difficult as effectively stopping illicit information
flow (see above). In principal this is handled via access
control, restricting access to only a handful of dossiers
makes aggregating information impossible. However, an
organizations typically want to aggregate their informa-
tion, for example to do efficiency studies or scientific
research, this is not an option. By limiting the number of
persons that have access to (almost) all dossiers unwanted
aggregation can be kept to a minimum. See the discussion
in Section VI for more on this subject.
I. Trusted Computing Base
All computer systems running the agent platforms must
be trusted: form a trusted computing base. This is in
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particular true for the centralized system run by the Public
Prosecution. This computer system stores all skeleton
files of digital criminal dossiers and runs both the PKI
infrastructure and the lookup service needed to find agents
and services in the distributed system.
Viewed in its totality as a distributed system, damage is
only severe if the Public Prosecution’s computer system
is compromised, see Section VI for a discussion of this
issue. Dedicated computers (not used for day-to-day com-
puting), dedicated users, including system administers,
and audit procedures are means to insure trust in the
system.
J. Secure Transfer
The agent platform provides secure transfer (based
on SSL tunnels) between agent platform locations for
free. Other security requirements are also handled by the
agent platform [14]: integrity of agents and their data
and secure communication between platform locations run
by organizations such as the Public Prosecution and the
Council for Child Welfare.
K. Compartmentalization of Information
Compartmentalization of information is again related to
the access control system. As access to criminal dossiers
is restricted to a few dossiers per employee this property
can be guaranteed.
L. Consistency
Consistency is checked whenever information from
an outside source (such as from the Council for Child
Welfare) is entered in the digital criminal dossier. A
dedicated consistency agent (per dossier) checks if all
administrative data from the outside source matches the
data in the digital dossier. If this is not the case a (human)
agent needs to decide how to act further. The consistency
agent marks such an event in the meta data of the digital
dossier. It is also possible for the agent to make an
‘educated guess’ related to (simple) consistency issues,
but a human user needs to confirm this. See [3] for more
details on this complicated issue.
M. Completeness
A dedicated agent checks the completeness of each
criminal dossier. A dossier should always include the re-
quired minimal information such as personal information,
criminal charge and warrants. Additional completeness
checks are performed on a per case basis. For example, a
dossier concerning a drunken driver case should include a
rapport that details the factual information of the alcohol
blood level at the time of the offense, again see [3].
N. Backups
A special purpose backup agent is deployed that fa-
cilitate secure backups of the digital dossier (combined
with the persistence database mentioned in point E. This
agent’s functionality is combined with the logging agent
(from point F), as these agents share a lot of functionality.
Note that the architecture described is inherently modular,
new security requirements can be added by new agents
that can be used whenever required.
V. DOMAIN SPECIFIC LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
A distributed digital criminal dossier in combination
with a multi-agent system to access and secure digital
dossiers has major benefits. However, a number of do-
main specific legal issues in relation to the use of agent
technology in a criminal trial, in a Dutch legal setting,
remain.
From a legal perspective it is important for all parties
to know to whom an agent belongs, as it acts on behalf
of this person/organization [15]. Identification is also
important when dealing with liability and compliance with
agreements. Legally, software agent themselves are not
responsible for their actions. The owner/user is always
responsible [16]: there must be a link between the agent
and its provider or user, see Section IV-F.
Relatively strict privacy regulations apply. As a guide-
line, Dutch law forbids the exchange of administrative
data, unless there is a valid legal reason to do so. In
all cases in which, for example, the Council for Child
Welfare is legally allowed to release personal data for the
digital dossier, it needs to inform the offending minor
of its action. The Public Prosecution is then expected
to carefully handle the received reports to guarantee the
privacy of the minor. In such instances the Council for
Child Welfare is also required by law to add a record
to the (local) dossier of the offending minor that states,
when and to whom what data was supplied.
Another criterion that applies in certain cases is the so
called ‘protection of others criterion’ [17]. In the example
of data exchange between the Public Prosecution and
the Council for Child Welfare this means that the Public
Prosecution can only give information to the Council for
Child Welfare when this is necessary for a good execution
of the tasks of the Public Prosecution and insofar a
weighty public interest is involved. Furthermore, giving
information to the Council for Child Welfare must serve
a purpose as stated in legislation. In the case of possible
child abuse or other domestic violence in which minors
are victims, the purpose is prevention of criminal acts
or supporting victims. In that case information is given
to the Council for Child Welfare. For the preparation of
dossiers the Minister of Justice gives copies of reports in
personal dossiers to the Director of the Council for Child
Welfare. Additional research for each type of offense is
needed to obtain a more complete overview of all legal
requirements and their applicability.
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
All main security requirements for an information man-
agement system for criminal dossiers have been addressed
in this paper. Distributed digital criminal dossiers used
together with a dedicated multi agent system solve most
of these. The remainder of this section discusses some of
the open questions and issues identified above.
In addition to the individual security properties de-
scribed above, the system as a whole also has some high
level security properties. The main security attribute is
that each organization can use its own refined security
policy. Such security policies state rules for all security
related issues. Some of these are global policies, that
is, they hold for all organizations involved. The role-
based access control mechanism described above is one
example. The use of one shared trusted lookup service to
find individual agents in the distributed system another.
Other rules in the security policy are however local: each
local organization controls who has access to its files, but
also which specific backup procedures are used, which
privacy policy regarding its data holds, etc.
As long as the computer system of the Public Pros-
ecution has not been compromised, the digital criminal
dossiers are not at risk. The computer systems of the Pub-
lic Prosecution, however, need to be trusted completely.
The lookup service, public key infrastructure and global
authentication mechanism are all hosted by the Public
Prosecution. If other systems are compromised the digital
dossier is not necessarily effected. Automatic consistency
checking, performed each time part of a dossier is altered,
detects modifications. If these modifications are unwar-
ranted and detected by both the dedicated agent and the
user, once informed, the original data is restored from the
secure backup service.
As stated earlier, completely preventing illicit infor-
mation flow remains an issue that is not solved at this
moment. Although it is not possible to move (parts of)
criminal dossiers to other dossiers as these are guarded
by access control lists, it is always possible for someone
to move the information contained in a criminal dossier to
another dossier ‘by hand’. More research on this subject
is needed.
Preventing illicit aggregation control is another prob-
lematic issue, as organizations typically want to aggregate
their information. One possibility is to only allow aggre-
gation of anonymized criminal dossiers, thereby disallow-
ing queries to individuals. But anonymizing information
in such a way that it is possible to draw some high level
conclusions -wanted by the organizations involved- and
disallow querying specific individuals is very hard, if not
impossible [18].
This paper studies the security issues related to the
use of distributed digital criminal dossiers. Other require-
ments, such as reliability, scalability and performance,
have not been studied. These issues are addressed in a
prototype implementation of the system proposed in this
paper which is currently under development. The agent
platform Agentscape [7] is being used to realize this
system.
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